In Re Murchison.
- Decided
- May 16, 1955
- Docket
- 405
- Status
- Published
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
Cited 2,510 timesNo negative treatment found in this library
What later courts said
- holding that “[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process” — Metzger v. Sebek (1994)
- holding that it was a violation of due process for one adjudicator to preside as the grand jury and judge for the same defendants — Bigby v. Dretke (2005)
- holding that the judge violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when he initiated, prosecuted, and adjudicated indirect criminal contempt charges — United States v. Whitt Neal (1996)
Each line is a later court’s own words about this case, not a summary. Read the opinion before relying on it.
How the opinion begins
Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court.
Michigan law authorizes any judge of its courts of record to act as a so-called “one-man grand jury.” [1] He can compel witnesses to appear before him in secret to testify about suspected crimes. We have previously held that such a Michigan “judge-grand jury” cannot consistently with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment summarily convict a witness of contempt for [*134] conduct in the secret hearings. In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257. We held that before such a conviction could stand, due process requires as a minimum that an accused be given a public trial after reasonable notice of the charges, have a right to examine witnesses against him, call witnesses on his own behalf, and be represented by counsel. The question now before us is whether a contempt proceeding conducted in accordance with these standards complies with the due process requirement of an impartial tribunal where the same judge presiding at the contempt hearing had also served as the “one-man grand jury” out of which the contempt charges arose. This does not involve, of course, the long-exercised power of courts summarily to punish certain conduct occurring in open court.[2]
The petitioners, Murchison and White, were called as witnesses before a “one-man judge-grand jury.” Murchison, a Detroit policeman, was interrogated at length in the judge’s secret hearings where questions were asked him about suspected gambling in Detroit and bribery of policemen. His answers left the judge persuaded that he had committed perjury, particularly in view of other evidence before the “judge-grand jury.” The judge then charged Murchison with perjury and ordered him to appear and show cause why he should not be punished for criminal contempt.[3] White, the other petitioner, was [*135] also summoned to appear as a witness in the same “one-man grand jury” hearing. Asked numerous questions about gambling and bribery, he refused to answer on the ground that he was entitled under Michigan law to have counsel present with him. The “judge-grand jury” charged White with contempt and ordered him to appear and show cause. The judge who had been the “grand jury” then tried both petitioners in open court, convicted and sentenced them for contempt. Petitioners objected to being tried for contempt by this particular judge for a number of reasons including: (1) Michigan law expressly provides that a judge conducting a “one-man grand jury” inquiry will be disqualified from hearing or trying any case arising from his inquiry or from hearing any motion to dismiss or quash any complaint or indictment growing out of it, or from hearing any charge of contempt “except alleged contempt for neglect or refusal to appear in response to a summons or subpoena”; (2) trial before the judge who was at the same time the complainant, indicter and prosecutor, constituted a denial of the fair and impartial trial required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The trial judge answered the first challenge by holding that the state statute barring him from trying the contempt cases violated the Michigan Constitution on the ground that it would deprive a judge of inherent power to punish contempt. This interpretation of the Michigan Constitution is binding here. As to the second challenge [*136] the trial judge held that due process did not forbid him to try the contempt charges. He also rejected other constitutional contentions made by petitioners. The State Supreme Court sustained all the trial judge’s holdings and affirmed.[4] Importance of the federal constitutional questions raised caused us to grant certiorari.[5] The view we take makes it unnecessary for us to consider or decide any of those questions except the due process challenge to trial by the judge who had conducted the secret “one-man grand jury” proceedings.[6]
Cite this
In Re Murchison., 349 U.S. 133 (1955)Read the full opinion
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