Green v. United States
- Decided
- December 16, 1957
- Docket
- 46
- Status
- Published
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
Cited 3,075 timesOverruled (not yet verified)Possible negative treatment: overruled, overruled in part, overruled in part on other grounds, overruled on other grounds (not yet verified) (flag from the other record of this decision, case 105662) · Russell Finnegan v. State of Indiana
What later courts said
- holding that jury’s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge — United States v. James R. Haga, Jr. (1987)
- holding that con- viction for second-degree murder operates as implied acquit- tal on first-degree murder count — Harrison v. Gillespie (2011)
- holding that greater and lesser included offenses were the “same offense” for purposes of double jeopardy — Jessica Williams v. Warden, for the State of Nevada Women's Correctional Facility, Christine Bodo (2005)
Each line is a later court’s own words about this case, not a summary. Read the opinion before relying on it.
How the opinion begins
Opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Black, announced by Mr. Justice Douglas.
This case presents a serious question concerning the meaning and application of that provision of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution which declares that no person shall “. . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . .
The petitioner, Everett Green, was indicted by a District of Columbia grand jury in two counts. The first charged that he had committed arson by maliciously setting fire to a house.[1] The second accused him of causing the death of a woman by this alleged arson which if true amounted to murder in the first degree punishable by death.[2] Green entered a plea of not guilty to both counts and the case was tried by a jury. After each side had presented its evidence the trial judge instructed the jury that it could find Green guilty of arson under the first count and of either (1) first degree murder or (2) second degree murder under the second count. The trial judge treated second degree murder, which is defined by the District Code as the killing of another with malice [*186] aforethought and is punishable by imprisonment for a term of years or for life,[3] as an offense included within the language charging first degree murder in the second count of the indictment.
Cite this
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957)Read the full opinion
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