Sherbert v. Verner

Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellant, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, was discharged by her South Carolina employer because she would not work on- Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith.[1] When she was unable to obtain' other employment because from conscientious scruples' she would not take Saturday work,[2] she filed a claim for [*400] unemployment compensation benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment -Compensation Act.[3] That law provides that, to be eligible for benefits, a claimant must be “able to work and . . . available for work’.'; and, fur [*401] ther, that a claimant is ineligible for benefits “ [i] f . . .-he has failed, without good causé . . . to accept available suitable work when offered him by the employment office or the employer . . . The appellee Employment Secu-. rity Commission, in administrative proceedings under the statute, found that appellant’s restriction upon her availability for Saturday work brought 'her within the provision disqualifying for benefits insured workers who fail, without good cause, to accept “suitable work when offered ... by the employment office or thé employer .'...” The Commission’s finding was sustained by the Court of Common Pleas for Spartanburg County.. That court’s judgment was* in turn affirmed by the South Carolina Supreme Court, which rejected appellant’s contention that, as applied to her, the disqualifying provisions of the South Carolina statute abridged her right to the free exercise of her religion secured under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment. The State Supreme Court held specifically that appellant’s ineligibility infringed no constitutional -liberties because such, a construction of the statute “places no restriction upon the appellant’s freedom .of religion nor does it in any way prevent her in the exercise of her right and freedom to observe her religious beliefs in accordance with the dictates of her conscience.” 240 S. C. 286, 303-304, 125 S. E. 2d 737, 746[4] We noted probable [*402] jurisdiction of appellant’s appeal. 371 TJ. S. 938. We reverse the judgmént of the South Carolina Supreme Court and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

I.