Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
- Decided
- May 29, 1973
- Docket
- 71-732
- Status
- Published
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
Cited 11,783 timesNo negative treatment found in this library
What later courts said
- holding that “there is nothing constitutionally suspect in a person[ ] voluntarily allowing a search” — State v. Cox (2005)
- holding that consent may be voluntary even without proof of the defendant's knowledge of a right to refuse — United States v. Oswald G. Blake, Leonard Eason (1989)
- holding that a consent to search is voluntary if uncoerced, even though the suspect has not been told of a right to say no — United States v. Nathan L. Hill and Cordell James (2001)
Each line is a later court’s own words about this case, not a summary. Read the opinion before relying on it.
How the opinion begins
Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court.
It is well settled under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments that a search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is “per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 454-455; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 51. It is equally well settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent. Davis v. United States, 328 U. S. 582, 593-594; Zap v. United States, 328 U. S. 624, 630. The constitutional question in the present case concerns the definition of “consent” in this Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment context.
I
Cite this
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)Read the full opinion
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