United States v. Turkette
- Decided
- June 17, 1981
- Docket
- 80-808
- Status
- Published
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
Cited 2,648 timesNo negative treatment found in this library
What later courts said
- recognizing that, although enterprise and pattern are distinct elements of racketeering, evidence proving these elements “may in particular cases coalesce” — United States v. Coppola (2012)
- holding that the term “enterprise” as used in RICO is not restricted to criminal enterprises — Roma Construction Company and Peter Zanni v. Ralph R. Arusso (1996)
- holding that RICO applies to both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises because the statute refers only to “enterprises” — Pamela A. Dorris v. Charles Absher and Della Absher (1999)
Each line is a later court’s own words about this case, not a summary. Read the opinion before relying on it.
How the opinion begins
Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court.
Chapter 96 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U. S. C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill), entitled [*578] Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO), was added to Title 18 by Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941. The question in this case is whether the term “enterprise” as used in RICO encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises or is limited in application to the former. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that Congress did not intend to include within the definition of “enterprise” those organizations which are exclusively criminal. 632 F. 2d 896 (1980). This position is contrary to that adopted by every other Circuit that has addressed the issue. [1]
We granted cer-tiorari to resolve this conflict. 449 U. S. 1123 (1981).
Statutes cited
Cite this
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981)Read the full opinion
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