Hill v. Lockhart
- Decided
- November 18, 1985
- Docket
- 84-1103
- Status
- Published
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
Cited 11,299 timesNo negative treatment found in this library
What later courts said
- holding that a Strickland claim can be brought to challenge a guilty plea, but rejecting the claim at issue — Stop Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection (2010)
- holding that a Strickland claim can be brought to challenge a guilty plea, but reject ing the claim at issue — Stop Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection (2010)
- holding that “the two-part Stride-land v. Washington [ 5 ] test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel” — Commonwealth v. Lewis (2013)
Each line is a later court’s own words about this case, not a summary. Read the opinion before relying on it.
How the opinion begins
Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner William Lloyd Hill pleaded guilty in the Arkansas trial court to charges of first-degree murder and theft of property. More than two years later he sought federal ha-beas relief on the ground that his court-appointed attorney had failed to advise him that, as a second offender, he was required to serve one-half of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas denied relief without a hearing, and the en banc Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed by an equally divided court. We granted certiorari because of the difference between the result reached in the present case and that reached by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Strader v. Garrison, 611 F. 2d 61 (1979). 470 U. S. 1049 (1985). We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit because we conclude that petitioner failed to allege the kind of prejudice from the allegedly incompetent advice of counsel that would have entitled him to a hearing.
Under Arkansas law, the murder charge to which petitioner pleaded guilty carried a potential sentence of 5 to 50 [*54] years or life in prison, along with a fine of up to $15,000. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§41-1502(3), 41-901(l)(a), 41-1101(l)(a) (1977). Petitioner’s court-appointed attorney negotiated a plea agreement pursuant to which the State, in return for petitioner’s plea of guilty to both the murder and theft charges, agreed to recommend that the trial judge impose concurrent prison sentences of 35 years for the murder and 10 years for the theft. Petitioner signed a written “plea statement” indicating that he understood the charges against him and the consequences of pleading guilty, that his plea had not been induced “by any force, threat, or promise” apart from the plea agreement itself, that he realized that the trial judge was not bound by the plea agreement and retained the sole “power of sentence,” and that he had discussed the plea agreement with his attorney and was satisfied with his attorney’s advice. The last two lines of the “plea statement,” just above petitioner’s signature, read: “I am aware of everything in this document. I fully understand what my rights are, and I voluntarily plead guilty because I am guilty as charged.”
Cite this
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985)Read the full opinion
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