Case law · Highest court · Federal

Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca

Decided
March 9, 1987
Docket
85-782
Status
Published
Jurisdiction
Federal

Cited 4,149 timesNo negative treatment found in this library

What later courts said

  • holding that “the language of the law cannot be enlarged beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms” — Rojas (2001)
  • holding that “the language of the law cannot be enlarged beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms” — ADENIJIi (1999)
  • recognizing that the Chevron framework applies when an agency arrives at an interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term “through a process of case-by-case adjudication” — Perez Suriel De Batista v. Gonzales (2007)

Each line is a later court’s own words about this case, not a summary. Read the opinion before relying on it.

How the opinion begins

[*423] Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.

Since 1980, the Immigration and Nationality Act has provided two methods through which an otherwise deportable alien who claims that he will be persecuted if deported can seek relief. Section 243(h) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1253(h), requires the Attorney General to withhold deportation of an alien who demonstrates that his “life or freedom would be threatened” on account of one of the listed factors if he is deported. In INS v. Stevic, 467 U. S. 407 (1984), we held that to qualify for this entitlement to withholding of deportation, an alien must demonstrate that “it is more likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecution” in the country to which he would be returned. Id., at 429-430. The Refugee Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 102, also established a second type of broader relief. Section 208(a) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1158(a), authorizes the Attorney General, in his discretion, to grant asylum to an alien who is unable or unwilling to return to his home country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” § 101(a)(42), 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(42).

In Stevie, we rejected an alien’s contention that the § 208(a) “well-founded fear” standard governs applications for withholding of deportation under 1243(h).[1] Similarly, today we reject the Government’s contention that the § 243(h) standard, which requires an alien to show that he is more likely than not to be subject to persecution, governs applications for asylum under § 208(a). Congress used different, broader language to define the term “refugee” as used in § 208(a) than it used to describe the class of aliens who have [*424] a right to withholding of deportation under § 243(h). The Act’s establishment of a broad class of refugees who are eligible for a discretionary grant of asylum, and a narrower class of aliens who are given a statutory right not to be deported to the country where they are in danger, mirrors the provisions of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which provided the motivation for the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980. In addition, the legislative history of the 1980 Act makes it perfectly clear that Congress did not intend the class of aliens who qualify as refugees to be coextensive with the class who qualify for § 243(h) relief.

Statutes cited

Cite this

Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987)

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