Bourjaily v. United States
- Decided
- June 23, 1987
- Docket
- 85-6725
- Status
- Published
- Jurisdiction
- Federal
Cited 2,639 timesSuperseded by statute (verified)Possible negative treatment: superseded by statute, superseded on other grounds (1 of 3 verified; none is a verified overruling) · Wiest v. Lynch
What later courts said
- holding that district courts may resolve preliminary questions under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) by preponderance of the evidence — United States v. Joseph Arnold (2007)
- holding that independent indicia of reliability are not required to admit co-conspirator statements under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) — United States v. Simmons (1991)
- ruling that "when the preliminary facts relevant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) are disputed, the offering party must prove them by a preponderance of the evidence” — United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Jim Gee and William C. Norris, Defendants-Appellants/cross-Appellees (2000)
Each line is a later court’s own words about this case, not a summary. Read the opinion before relying on it.
How the opinion begins
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) provides: “A statement is not hearsay if. . . [t]he statement is offered against a party and is ... a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” We granted certiorari to answer three questions regarding the admission of statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E): (1) whether the court must determine by independent evidence that the conspiracy existed and that the defendant and the declarant were members of this conspiracy; (2) the quantum of proof on which such determinations must be based; and (3) whether a court must in each case examine the circumstances of such a statement to determine its reliability. 479 U. S. 881 (1986).
In May 1984, Clarence Greathouse, an informant working for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), arranged to sell a kilogram of cocaine to Angelo Lonardo. Lonardo agreed that he would find individuals to distribute the drug. When the sale became imminent, Lonardo stated in a tape-recorded telephone conversation that he had a “gentleman friend” who had some questions to ask about the cocaine. In a subse [*174] quent telephone call, Greathouse spoke to the “friend” about the quality of the drug and the price. Greathouse then spoke again with Lonardo, and the two arranged the details of the purchase. They agreed that the sale would take place in a designated hotel parking lot, and Lonardo would transfer the drug from Greathouse’s car to the “friend,” who would be waiting in the parking lot in his own car. Greathouse proceeded with the transaction as planned, and FBI agents arrested Lonardo and petitioner immediately after Lonardo placed a kilogram of cocaine into petitioner’s car in the hotel parking lot. In petitioner’s car, the agents found over $20,000 in cash.
Statutes cited
Cite this
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987)Read the full opinion
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